

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE 1300 BROADWAY, SUITE 250 DENVER, CO 80203	
<b>Complainant:</b> THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO	Case Number: <b>24PDJ085</b>
<b>Respondent:</b> MARK H. WILSON, #45992	
<b>OPINION IMPOSING SANCTIONS UNDER C.R.C.P. 242.31(a)</b>	

**SUMMARY**

On April 8, 2025, following a hearing on the sanctions, a hearing board suspended Mark H. Wilson (“Respondent”) for one year and one day. The suspension is scheduled to take effect on June 26, 2025.

From March 2023 to August 2024, Respondent did not voluntarily pay any court-ordered child support or maintenance. He was jailed for contempt. When he was released, he fell behind on payments again. Even so, he did not object to or seek to modify his support obligations until December 2024. Respondent thereby violated Colo. RPC 3.4(c), which forbids lawyers from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists. Respondent’s misconduct warrants his suspension for one year and one day.

**I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

On November 8, 2024, the People filed a one-claim complaint with Presiding Disciplinary Judge Bryon M. Large (“the PDJ”), alleging that Respondent violated Colo. RPC 3.4(c) by knowingly failing to pay court-ordered child support and spousal maintenance. Respondent answered the complaint on December 6, 2024.

About two weeks later, the People moved for judgment on the pleadings. Respondent timely responded. On January 23, 2025, the PDJ issued an “Order Denying the People’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Under C.R.C.P. 12(c).” In that order, the PDJ found the pleadings demonstrated as a matter of law that Respondent knowingly violated court orders in his domestic relations case when he failed to pay child support and maintenance. But the facts alleged in the

pleadings did not conclusively establish that Respondent failed to openly and timely refuse to comply with those orders based on an assertion that he was under no valid obligation to do so.

The People then moved for summary judgment on March 5, 2025, asking the PDJ to enter judgment in their favor on their sole claim. Respondent did not respond. On April 1, 2025, the PDJ entered summary judgment in the People's favor and converted the one-day disciplinary hearing set for Tuesday, April 8, 2025, to a one-day hearing on the sanctions to determine the appropriate discipline.

On April 8, 2025, a Hearing Board comprising the PDJ and lawyers Alison Roberts and Sara Van Deusen held a hearing under C.R.C.P. 242.30. Vos attended for the People; Respondent did not appear. The Hearing Board received remote testimony via videoconference from Adrienne Juliette Wilson, whose domestic relations lawyer, Leonard Higgins, also attended via videoconference. The PDJ admitted exhibits S1, S2, S5, S7-S9, S18-S20, S24, and S25 into evidence.

## **II. FACTS AND RULE VIOLATIONS ESTABLISHED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

Respondent was admitted to practice law in Colorado on July 30, 2013, under attorney registration number 45992. Respondent is thus subject to the Hearing Board's jurisdiction in this proceeding.

The findings of fact regarding Respondent's rule violations are drawn from the undisputed material facts set forth in the PDJ's summary judgment order.

### **Facts Established on Summary Judgment**

Respondent filed for divorce from Adrienne Wilson in Arapahoe County. Respondent and Ms. Wilson have one child together. The district court issued a decree of dissolution of marriage on February 9, 2023, and entered permanent orders in the case on March 3, 2023. Under the permanent orders, Respondent was required to pay Ms. Wilson \$1,342.00 in monthly child support and \$662.00 in spousal maintenance. Respondent had actual notice of the permanent orders.

In his discovery responses in this case, Respondent described his filings with the district court:

2/9/23 Permanent Orders Hearing:

At that hearing I testified what amount of support . . . I could afford, given my income.

2/9/23-3/21/23 Discussions with counsel to appeal permanent orders. Counsel advised that the imputation of income was legally deficient.

7/2[4]/23: Motion to Modify filed.

8/14/23: Motion to Modify filed.

10/2/23-present: Contempt motion filed by [Ms. Wilson]-Contempt has been ongoing since then.

1/10/24 I filed an application for state paid legal assistance.

Most recent Motion to Modify in December, 2024.

Multiple appeals, Motion for Disqualification of Magistrate, etc.[1]

But in his forthwith motion to modify dated July 24, 2023, Respondent did not challenge the district court's child support or maintenance orders; instead, he moved to modify and clarify the court's parenting time orders. In that motion, Respondent stated, "[Respondent] isn't trying to relitigate the [district court's] imputed income, but rather request relief from Dr. Willson's additional requirements." [2]

Respondent filed a second forthwith motion to modify on August 14, 2023. But in that motion, Respondent did not challenge the district court's child support or maintenance orders; instead, he moved to modify and clarify its parenting time orders. Respondent reiterated in his motion, "[Respondent] isn't trying to relitigate the [district court's] imputed income, but rather request relief from Dr. Willson's additional requirements." [3]

On October 2, 2023, Ms. Wilson moved for a contempt citation based on Respondent's failure to pay support. Respondent filed a variety of motions and petitions related to the contempt citation. None of those filings stated that Respondent refused to comply with the permanent orders based on an assertion that no valid obligation existed. On January 10, 2024, Respondent moved for the appointment of a state-paid professional.

Meanwhile, Respondent notified the Office of Attorney Registration in his February 2024 attorney registration statement that he was not in compliance with his court-ordered child support payments.

The district court held a hearing in the domestic relations case on February 14, 2024. As of that hearing, Respondent had child support arrearages of \$15,005.77. He was also behind \$7,822.28 in spousal maintenance at the time. Respondent testified during that February 2024 hearing, but he did not argue that he had no obligation to comply with the permanent orders in the case. [4]

The district court ordered Respondent to pay Ms. Wilson a total of \$22,828.05 by June 15, 2024, and threatened Respondent with incarceration if he did not pay the full sum by that date. The district court set another hearing to take place several months later and informed Respondent that if he remained in contempt at that hearing, he would face up to six months in jail.

On February 28, 2024, Respondent petitioned for review of the contempt order. In that petition, Respondent challenged the contempt order but not the underlying permanent orders. Respondent filed a second petition for review on March 19, 2024. In the second petition, Respondent challenged the order adopting the findings of the parenting coordinator/decision-maker in the domestic relations case, but he did not challenge the underlying permanent orders.

Meanwhile, on March 29, 2024, Respondent received notice that his federal tax refund had been seized for child support in the amount of \$8,368.00. On April 30, 2024, the Colorado Department of Revenue notified Respondent and his new spouse that their state tax refund had been seized for child support in the amount of \$6,902.00.

On April 19, 2024, Respondent filed “[Respondent’s] Petition for Magistrate Review of Reply to [Ms. Wilson’s] Request for a Stay Filed April 5, 2024.” On June 4, 2024, Respondent filed “[Respondent’s] Reply to [Ms. Wilson’s] Memorandum Brief re Contempt Filed April 2, 2024.” In that reply, Respondent challenged the contempt charge but not the underlying permanent orders.

On July 22, 2024, Respondent filed “[Respondent’s] Motion and Affidavit for Recusal/Disqualification of Magistrate Frank Anthony Moschetti.” The next day, Respondent filed “[Respondent’s] Motion for Reconsideration.” In that motion, Respondent sought reconsideration of the contempt finding, but he did not seek reconsideration of the underlying permanent orders.

As of August 2, 2024, Respondent had not made any voluntary payments towards either arrearage. On that date, the domestic relations court held a contempt review hearing. The court found that Respondent was guilty of contempt, and it sentenced him to six months of county jail. Respondent was remanded to jail the same day. The court provided, however, that Respondent could petition for early release if he paid the outstanding arrearage.

On August 8, 2024, Respondent’s parents paid Ms. Wilson the total sum of \$22,828.05 via check. On August 9, 2024, Respondent filed a forthwith motion to suspend his remaining jail sentence and requested an order releasing him from jail. The district court granted Respondent’s release on August 12, 2024; Respondent was released from jail the same day. With Respondent’s parents’ total payment of \$22,828.05 to Ms. Wilson, in addition to Respondent’s seized tax return payments, Ms. Wilson may have received more than the outstanding arrearage total.

On August 15, 2024, Respondent filed a forthwith motion to clarify parenting time. Respondent’s motion did not challenge the permanent orders in the case. On August 26, 2024, Respondent filed replies in support of his motion to disqualify Magistrate Moschetti and in support of his motion for reconsideration of the contempt order. Neither of these replies challenged the permanent orders in the case or argued that no valid obligation existed.

Respondent filed a notice of appeal in the domestic relations case on September 27, 2024. In the notice of appeal, Respondent did not challenge the permanent orders. Nor did Respondent challenge the permanent orders in a second notice of appeal, which he filed on October 18, 2024.

On December 6, 2024, Respondent moved to modify child support and parenting time, arguing that the permanent orders in the case should be modified retroactively.

### **Rule Violation Established on Summary Judgment**

On summary judgment, the PDJ concluded as a matter of law that Respondent violated Colo. RPC 3.4(c), which forbids lawyers from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.

The PDJ found that Respondent knowingly violated the district court's permanent orders dated March 3, 2023, reasoning that as of the hearing on February 14, 2024, Respondent had amassed \$15,005.77 in child support arrearages and was behind \$7,822.28 in spousal maintenance. The PDJ also pointed to Respondent's own report in his February 2024 attorney registration statement that he was not in compliance with his court-ordered child support payments. Further, the PDJ determined that Respondent continued to knowingly violate the permanent orders after the hearing on February 14, 2024. The undisputed material facts showed that before August 2024, Respondent made no voluntary payments toward his support obligations. The PDJ also found that although Respondent's federal and state tax returns were seized in March and April 2024, respectively, his arrearages were not thereby erased, as the combined returns were insufficient to cover his ongoing child support obligations. As such, the PDJ concluded, the undisputed facts established as a matter of law that Respondent knowingly violated the permanent orders for at least the period between March 2023 and August 2024.

Next, the PDJ determined that even though Respondent violated the permanent orders in his domestic relations case from at least March 2023 to August 2024, he did not seek to challenge those orders until December 6, 2024, when he moved to modify the amounts he paid in support. As a result, the PDJ held, Respondent flouted his child support and maintenance orders, without openly contesting them, from March 2023 until at least August 2024. The PDJ found that Respondent's conduct per se violated Colo. RPC 3.4(c).

### III. SANCTIONS

The American Bar Association *Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions* ("ABA *Standards*")<sup>[5]</sup> and Colorado Supreme Court case law guide the imposition of sanctions for lawyer misconduct.<sup>[6]</sup> When imposing a sanction after finding lawyer misconduct, the Hearing Board must consider the duty the lawyer violated, the lawyer's mental state, and the actual or potential injury the lawyer's misconduct caused. These three variables yield a presumptive sanction that the Hearing Board may then adjust based on aggravating and mitigating factors.

#### ***ABA Standard 3.0 – Duty, Mental State, and Injury***

Duty. Lawyers are members of the public; as such, they are obligated to follow all laws and court orders. But lawyers are also officers of the court and thus bear a heightened duty to operate within the bounds of the law and uphold the legal process. By failing to voluntarily pay any court-ordered child support from March 2023 until at least August 2024, Respondent operated outside

the bounds of the law, disobeyed his obligations under the rules of a tribunal, and undermined the integrity of the legal system he is duty-bound to support.

*Mental State.* The PDJ's order granting summary judgment concluded that the People proved every element of their Colo. RPC 3.4(c) claim, which expressly requires proof that Respondent acted with a knowing mental state. The evidence adduced at the hearing on the sanctions bolsters this finding: the transcript of the February 2024 hearing, for example, shows that Respondent was aware of his support obligations and that he knew he had not satisfied those obligations.[7]

*Injury.* Ms. Wilson attested to the injury she has sustained because of Respondent's dereliction of his duties as a parent. According to Ms. Wilson, she and Respondent were married in June 2014; at that time, she was working as a high school teacher and he as the owner of a tax law practice. But when Respondent and Ms. Wilson's child was born in April 2018, the couple agreed that Ms. Wilson should remain home with their baby on a full-time basis, with Respondent assuming the role of the family's sole breadwinner.[8] They adhered to that arrangement until April 2020, when Respondent filed for divorce and Ms. Wilson returned to the classroom to earn money. While temporary orders were in effect, Respondent paid Ms. Wilson approximately \$1,000.00 per month.[9] But after permanent orders entered on March 3, 2023, Respondent discontinued all payments and ceased communicating about his support obligations, Ms. Wilson testified.

According to Ms. Wilson, Respondent did not voluntarily make any support payments between March 2023 and August 2024. He was jailed for contempt in August 2024. When he was released more than a week later, Ms. Wilson said, he began making partial support payments—\$250.00 in August and November 2024 and January and February 2025—which represents just a fraction of his monthly obligation.[10] Indeed, between August 2024 and February 2025, he paid just \$1,000.00, whereas he was required to pay around \$12,000.00 for that period.[11] Ms. Wilson could not explain why Respondent chose to pay only \$250.00 in those months, as the permanent orders have not changed since their issuance in March 2023.

Ms. Wilson testified that Respondent's evasion of his parental duties has financially and emotionally harmed her and their child. To compensate for the loss of funds resulting from Respondent's failure to pay, Ms. Wilson works overtime by teaching an extra class in addition to her full-time courseload. But without Respondent's financial contribution, Ms. Wilson has been limited financially. She has dipped into her savings and accrued credit card debt to provide for their child and to pay her own mounting attorney's fees. Those fees currently hover around \$40,000.00, some portion of which is attributable to her efforts to compel Respondent to comply with his support obligations.

Because Respondent is an officer of the court, his delinquency has also harmed the profession and the legal system. As a lawyer, Respondent is required to abide by legal rules and court orders to promote the administration of justice, yet he disregarded orders requiring him to financially support his child. To the extent Respondent disagreed with the calculation, he declined to challenge the orders through any legal process. When Respondent simply ignored his court-

mandated responsibilities, rather than seek relief through legitimate channels, it reflected poorly on him as well as on all lawyers and the system of justice they represent.

### ***ABA Standards 4.0-7.0 – Presumptive Sanction***

Suspension is the presumptive sanction for Respondent's misconduct in this case, as set forth in ABA Standard 6.22, which governs a lawyer's knowing violation of a court order or rule that results in injury or potential injury to a party or interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding.

### ***ABA Standard 9.0 – Aggravating and Mitigating Factors***

Aggravating circumstances include any considerations that justify an increase in the degree of the sanction to be imposed, while mitigating factors warrant a reduction in the severity of the sanction.[12] As explained below, we apply six factors in aggravation, assigning moderate weight to five. Three factors are entitled to mitigating recognition, but none merits any more than nominal weight.

#### Aggravating Factors

*Dishonest or Selfish Motive – 9.22(b):* The People urge us to apply this factor, arguing that Respondent withheld support funds to benefit himself, which ultimately operated to the detriment of his child. Evidence showed that Respondent honored his child support obligations while temporary orders were in effect but ceased to do so after permanent orders entered demonstrates his selfishness. The evidence also showed that since March 2023, Respondent has taken two vacations out of the country, leading us to infer that he applied available funds for his own comfort and enjoyment while disregarding the needs of his child.[13] Further, Respondent failed to challenge the permanent orders while refusing to obey them, which connotes even more clearly that he elevated his own personal desires and conveniences above those of his child and the legal system.[14] Respondent did not appear at the hearing to offer any evidence to the contrary or provide an explanation for his actions. We thus agree with the People and find that Respondent acted selfishly in his domestic relations case.

*Pattern of Misconduct – 9.22(c):* Respondent's behavior since March 2023 is fairly considered a continuing pattern of disregarding his parental obligations and disregarding his duties as a lawyer to obey orders until those orders are successfully challenged. We thus apply this factor.

*Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Conduct – 9.22(g):* In his answer to the People's complaint in this disciplinary case, Respondent advanced the argument that if the domestic relations court retroactively modified the permanent orders, that modification would

nullify his period of disobedience. We believe this argument evidences, at a minimum, a fundamental lack of understanding and refusal to acknowledge his duty to comply with all court orders, even those he believes are erroneous, unless and until those orders have been modified, reconsidered, or overturned by an appellate court.[15] We give aggravating weight to this factor.

Vulnerability of Victim – 9.22(h): We find that Respondent's child, who is entitled to financial support from Respondent, is a vulnerable victim. Respondent's child cannot self-advocate in the legal system and must rely on Ms. Wilson and her limited resources to compel Respondent to contribute to his child's living expenses. This is a factor aggravating Respondent's misconduct.

Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law – 9.22(i): Respondent was licensed to practice law in Colorado in 2013, boasts an L.L.M. in taxation, and owns his own law firm. We consider Respondent's experience as a lawyer at the time of his misconduct as an aggravating factor but find that it does little to exacerbate his misconduct, which occurred in the context of his personal affairs.

Indifference to Making Restitution – 9.32(j): Following entry of permanent orders, Respondent did not pay a dime toward his support obligations until he was jailed for contempt. He was released after satisfying those arrears but has since paid only a fraction of a few monthly support payments. We consider this factor in aggravation.

#### Mitigating Factors

Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record – 9.32(a): Respondent has no record of prior discipline. We thus apply this factor but give it little weight, as even first-year law students know that lawyers must comply with court orders.

Full and Free Disclosure or Cooperative Attitude Toward the Proceeding – 9.32(e): In their hearing brief, the People recommend applying this mitigating factor. At the hearing, however, the People intimated that in light of Respondent's failure to respond to their summary judgment motion, his failure to submit prehearing materials, and his failure to appear for the hearing, the Hearing Board ought to carefully consider whether this factor pertains. While apparently Respondent was cooperative during the initial stages of this case, including during the People's investigation, his willingness to participate trailed off at the most important procedural juncture: the hearing itself. As such, any mitigation for cooperation in the early part of the disciplinary process is outweighed by Respondent's latter-stage lack of participation. We cannot give him any more than negligible credit for cooperating in a proceeding that he eventually all but dropped out of.

Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions – 9.32(k): The People contend that Respondent is entitled to mitigation because he was jailed for contempt in the underlying domestic relations matter. The Hearing Board accepts the People's recommendation but gives this factor very limited

weight, because Respondent was released from confinement soon after he paid his support arrears. As such, the district court's purpose in remanding him into custody was remedial—to compel him to comply with the permanent orders—rather than punitive.

### **Analysis Under ABA *Standards* and Case Law**

The Hearing Board heeds the Colorado Supreme Court's directive to exercise discretion in imposing a sanction because "individual circumstances make extremely problematic any meaningful comparison of discipline ultimately imposed in different cases."<sup>[16]</sup> As such, the Hearing Board must determine the appropriate sanction here on a case-by-case basis, looking to the ABA *Standards* for guidance in the exercise of that discretion. The ABA *Standards* offers a theoretical framework that provides for "the flexibility to select the appropriate sanction in [a] particular case" after the Hearing Board carefully considers the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors.<sup>[17]</sup> Thus, while prior decisions imposing sanctions for lawyer misconduct can be persuasive, the Hearing Board is free to distinguish those cases and deviate from the presumptive sanction when appropriate.

As discussed above, the presumptive sanction for Respondent's misconduct under the ABA *Standards* is a period of suspension, which should generally be equal to or greater than six months,<sup>[18]</sup> adjusted according to the relative weight and number of applicable aggravating and mitigating factors. Here, the six aggravating factors significantly overshadow the three mitigating factors, to which we accorded almost no weight. Using that yardstick, Respondent's period of suspension should exceed a period of six months.

Prior cases have reached the same conclusion. We consider, in particular, three seminal Colorado Supreme Court cases involving failure to pay child support. First, in *People v. Hanks*, a lawyer who willfully failed to pay child support was suspended for one year and one day.<sup>[19]</sup> The lawyer had been ordered to pay \$20,000.00 in past-due child support and \$1,500.00 per month for his three children, but he made little or no financial contribution over a three-year period and was \$55,282.62 in arrears at the time of the disciplinary hearing.<sup>[20]</sup> Second, in *People v. Jaramillo*, a lawyer who had no prior discipline amassed child support arrearages of \$11,296.77 over several years, making only a few payments to reduce that amount.<sup>[21]</sup> Later, the lawyer was charged with driving with a suspended license, driving without insurance, and leaving the scene of an accident.<sup>[22]</sup> He was suspended for one year and one day for violating state laws and for failing to pay court-ordered child support.<sup>[23]</sup> Finally, in *In re Green*, a lawyer without a history of discipline knowingly failed over the course of five years to pay more than \$11,000.00 in court-mandated child support.<sup>[24]</sup> He was suspended for one year and one day, but the Colorado Supreme Court permitted him to reinstate early, conditioned on a three-year period of probation, if he paid his past-due child support or negotiated a payment plan approved by the appropriate court.<sup>[25]</sup>

The Hearing Board has carefully considered these cases, which suggest that a suspension of more than one year is fitting when lawyers fail to honor their child support obligations. The

Hearing Board has also measured these cases against the circumstances here. For thirteen months, from March 2023 through February 2024, Respondent paid no money in child support or maintenance. He was warned in February 2024 that the same course of conduct could result in six months' incarceration. But he did not make any support payments in the wake of that hearing. In late March and April 2024, his federal and state tax refunds were seized. Still, he paid nothing thereafter. In August 2024, Respondent was remanded into custody, where he spent approximately ten days in jail. On his release, he began to make sporadic support payments, but he unilaterally chose the payment amounts, each of which represented just a fraction of the monthly court-ordered sums he owes. Only after the People filed suit in this case in November 2024 did Respondent request that the domestic relations court adjust the amount he owes in monthly support payments. Finally, Respondent disengaged from this process, declining to respond to summary judgment, contravening the PDJ's order to submit prehearing materials, and forgoing the opportunity to participate in the hearing.

The Hearing Board finds that a fully served suspension of one year and one day is the only appropriate sanction here. We contemplated whether to follow *Green* by offering Respondent an opportunity to reinstate early if he paid his support arrearages or negotiated a payment plan, which the *Green* court described as a "practical and meaningful way to encourage a lawyer who is in arrears on child support to make a good-faith effort to satisfy those obligations." [26] But we do not believe that such an arrangement would account for Respondent's chronic disregard of court orders, whether those orders were issued in his domestic relations case or here, in his lawyer discipline case. He has, on the whole, already rebuffed several opportunities to make good-faith efforts to satisfy his support obligations. Further, in our view, offering such an arrangement would be inconsistent with our mandate to ensure Respondent understands that as a lawyer he is duty-bound to obey court orders and honor the legal process. His actions convey that he does not appreciate either responsibility and has little commitment to reforming his conduct. To best protect the public, the profession, and the legal system, we conclude that Respondent should be required to petition for reinstatement of his law license, where he must demonstrate that he apprehends the wrongfulness of his behavior and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he has changed in ways that reduce the likelihood he again defies court orders or his support obligations.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

For more than two years, Respondent has flouted his court-ordered obligations to financially support his child and his former spouse. For most of that time, Respondent chose not to challenge his support obligations or seek to modify them. But lawyers cannot ignore court orders or unilaterally modify them; through the legal process, they must challenge orders they do not believe they can or should obey. Because Respondent failed to do so, and because he chronically disregarded his financial obligations as a parent and his legal obligations as a lawyer, he should be suspended for one year and one day.

## V. ORDER

The Hearing Board **ORDERS**:

1. **MARK H. WILSON**, attorney registration number **45992**, is **SUSPENDED FOR ONE YEAR AND ONE DAY** from the practice of law in Colorado. The suspension will take effect upon issuance of an "Order and Notice of Suspension." [27]
2. If Respondent wishes to seek reinstatement to the practice of law in Colorado after his suspension, he must file a petition for reinstatement under C.R.C.P. 242.39(b).
3. Respondent **MUST** promptly comply with C.R.C.P. 242.32(b)-(e), concerning winding up of affairs, notice to current clients, duties owed in litigation matters, and notice to other jurisdictions where he is licensed or otherwise authorized to practice law.
4. Within fourteen days of issuance of the "Order and Notice of Suspension," Respondent **MUST** file an affidavit with the PDJ under C.R.C.P. 242.32(f), attesting to his compliance with C.R.C.P. 242.32. As provided in C.R.C.P. 242.41(b)(5), lists of pending matters, lists of clients, and copies of client notices under C.R.C.P. 242.32(f) must be marked as confidential attachments and filed as separate documents from the affidavit.
5. The parties **MUST** file any posthearing motions **no later than June 5, 2025**. Any response thereto **MUST** be filed within seven days.
6. The parties **MUST** file any application for stay pending appeal **no later than the date on which the notice of appeal is due**. Any response thereto **MUST** be filed within seven days.
7. Respondent **MUST** pay the costs of this proceeding. The People **MUST** submit a statement of costs **no later than June 5, 2025**. Any response challenging the reasonableness of those costs **MUST** be filed within seven days thereafter.

DATED THIS 22<sup>nd</sup> DAY OF MAY, 2025.

BRYON M. LARGE  
PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE

ALISON ROBERTS  
HEARING BOARD MEMBER

SARA VAN DEUSEN  
HEARING BOARD MEMBER

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[1] Order Granting Summ. J. at 3.

[2] Order Granting Summ. J. at 3.

[3] Order Granting Summ. J. at 4.

[4] At that hearing, the district court found Respondent was in remedial contempt of its orders. Ex. S9.

[5] Found in ABA *Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions* (2d ed. 2019).

[6] *See In re Roose*, 69 P.3d 43, 46-47 (Colo. 2003).

[7] *See* Ex. S8 at 39:17-23, 42:16-43:3, 48:18-49:17.

[8] Even so, Respondent has reported zero taxable income since 2017. *See* Ex. S25 at 420; Ex. S18 at 243.

[9] *See* Ex. S7.

[10] *See* Ex. S25 at 410.

[11] *See* Ex. S25 at 410.

[12] *See* ABA *Standards* 9.21 and 9.31.

[13] *See* Ex. S5 at 101; Ex. S8 at 39:4-9; Ex. S19 at 3:17-22.

[14] *See In re Green*, 982 P.2d 838, 839 (Colo. 1999) (approving application of the aggravating factor of selfish motive based on the lawyer's failure to resolve his child support debt).

[15] *See Chapman v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co.*, 613 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1979) ("An attorney who believes a court order is erroneous is not relieved of the duty to obey it. The proper course of action, unless and until the order is invalidated by an appellate court, is to comply and cite the order as reversible error should an adverse judgment result."); *In re Ford*, 128 P.3d 178, 181 (Alaska 2006) (finding that the proper course of action for a lawyer who believed a court's order was invalid was to openly inform the court that he could not comply with the order, challenge the order, and take steps to preserve the status quo during that challenge).

[16] *In re Attorney F.*, 2012 CO 57 ¶ 20 (*quoting In re Rosen*, 198 P.3d 116, 121 (Colo. 2008)).

[17] *Id.* ¶ 3.

[18] *See* ABA *Standard* 2.3 (providing that a suspension generally should be for a period of time equal to or greater than six months).

[19] 967 P.2d 144, 145 (Colo. 1998).

[20] *Id.* at 145-46.

[21] 35 P.3d 136, 138-39 (Colo. 1999).

[22] *Id.*

[23] *Id.*

[24] 982 P.2d at 839.

[25] *Id.*

[26] 982 P.2d at 838.

[27] In general, an order and notice of sanction will issue thirty-five days after a decision is entered under C.R.C.P. 242.31(a)(6). In some instances, the order and notice may issue later than the thirty-five days by operation of C.R.C.P. 242.35, C.R.C.P. 59, or other applicable rules.